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URING THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION two relatively independent developments joined forces: the mechanization of the world picture, to use Anneliese Maier's famous term, and the recognition of the crucial role to be played by observation and experiment in the establishment of a scientifically valid theory. The attempt to describe natural phenomena by means of particles and motion was appealing to the new scientific age. Within a few decades corpuscular theories of matter evolved from the obliquity of a controversial fancy into a widely accepted rationale. Compared, however, to the rise of astronomy and mechanics, this success remained ambiguous. Seventeenth-century atomism did not necessarily provide fertile soil for an understanding of material properties and processes. Its empirical background was weak, and not one of its alleged proofs would be accepted by today's scientific standards. In Galileo's inclined plane and his law of falling bodies, or in Newton's theory of colors and his experimentum crucis with the prism, theory and experiment, observation and conclusion, were connected in a way that is still convincing. In atomism, however, there was no experimental proof possible, although most corpuscular theories of the seventeenth century explicitly claimed to be based upon experience. But it was not until the nineteenth century that experimental results made the atomic theory at least plausible.
The questionable relationship between seventeenth-century atomism and its empirical background has been obscured to some extent by later historians. When the standard histories of atomism were written, the atomic hypothesis itself was still very much under debate. Twentieth-century historians of science, on the other hand, have all too easily taken the atom for granted. With few exceptions they dealt with these issues in terms of mere intellectual history and neglected the empirical aspects or underestimated their importance. In 1968 Hans Kangro reminded us that the empirical difficulties involved in early modern corpuscularianism are well worth being studied by historians of science.
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In this article I give a historical typology and evaluation of the arguments presented in support of the corpuscular hypothesis during the first half of the seventeenth century. I intend to focus on authors who considered themselves empiricists; in their systems the clearest departure from merely bookish reasoning should be expected. Nevertheless, the empirical approach was embedded in a whole network of ontological, epistemological, and mathematical arguments. Such arguments created patterns of thought and habits of perception that were instrumental in the acceptance of the corpuscular view.
I. PARTICLES: PRESUPPOSITION OR PROOF?
Early in the seventeenth century, the assumption of the existence of atoms was by no means a scientific hypothesis that could be proposed without extensive justification of its empirical validity, philosophical soundness, and religious acceptability. One does not even need to go as far as Pietro Redondi in his recent Galileo erético to see that atomism was a most dangerous topic indeed.
2 Its experimental confirmation would have been extremely momentous, not only for the theory of matter.
In 1624 Jean Bitaud and Antoine de Villon, two otherwise unknown Parisian scholars, announced a public tribunal directed against the doctrines of Aristotle and Paracelsus. They were assisted by Etienne de Clave, a physician and skilled chemist, who was scheduled to prove the truth of the assertions by public experiments. The theses the three authors prepared for this event were aimed at disproving the Peripatetic assumptions about matter and form, and the Paracelsian tria prima. They culminated in the fourteenth thesis in a clear commitment to atomism: "Omnia . . . esse in omnibus, et omnia componi ex Atomis seu indivisibilibus. Quod utrumque, quia rationi, verae philosophiae, et corporum anatomiae conforme est, mordicüs defendimus, et intrepidi sustinemus." The reaction of the authorities was surprisingly vigorous. Not only was the assembly that had gathered for the event dissolved, one of the organizers arrested, and the theses torn up, but it was also forbidden to propagate anything of this nature under penalty of death. 3 It remains unclear whether the authorities intervened because an atomic theory of matter seemed to question the transubstantiation of the Eucharist. We are more concerned with the assertion, proposed by the authors, that the atomic doctrine was not only reasonable but also in accordance with chemical analysis (corporum anatomiae conforme) and that there were experiments or observations that would immediately decide between the competing hypotheses about the nature of matter and thus convince everybody: "Experientijs atque iteratis rationibus ita sua dicta comprobet, omniumque oculis tarn aperté subjicitat, ut omnes adstantes verissima haec omnia uno simul ore fatentur." 4 When Robert Boyle, only a generation later, began to establish his corpuscular philosophy, a mechanical theory of matter based exclusively upon the two principles "matter" and "motion," he did not dwell on the trifling task of proving the existence of atoms or corpuscles first. Instead, he presupposed them and developed his hypothesis to direct and explain the experimental operations based on it. Although Boyle admitted that there was little systematic connection between empirical facts and the corpuscular hypothesis, the operational, if not ontological, status of the corpuscles was beyond any doubt.
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In the Sceptical Chymist y published in 1661, he devoted much effort to criticizing and refuting experimentally the doctrines of elements or principles proposed by the Peripatetics and Paracelsians, yet his own corpuscular alternatives were never exposed to the touchstone of the experiment.
II. THE RISE OF ATOMISM
The knowledge of classical atomism had been passed down to the Renaissance humanists through different lines of tradition. Above all, there was Aristotle's consistent refutation of it, which became an integral part of every scholar's training in philosophy. Second, the writings of Greek medicine incorporated important relics of atomism. Besides these, the doctrine of minima naturalia, as put forth in the Averroist tradition of commentators and more fully developed in the sixteenth century, provided a concept of small, qualitatively different parts of matter that related more closely to experience than did the atoms of the ancients. 6 The minima, however, were not mechanical particles and could not sim-ply be translated into corpuscular terms. Therefore, additional factors are necessary to account for the sudden rise and reluctant acceptance of atomism in the first half of the seventeenth century, just as the attractiveness of Aristotelianism was fading away. When in 1417 the lost De rerum natura by Lucretius, with its wealth of immediately convincing imagery, was rediscovered, it provided the proper impulse at the very best moment. The editio princeps appeared in 1473, only three years after the first Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius's biographical history of philosophy, the last two books of which dealt with Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. Still, it was some time before its influence became evident in the natural sciences. The Italian physician Girolamo Fracastoro, in his De sympathia et antipathia rerum of 1545, was probably the first of the humanists to use the ancient atomic theory in explaining physical and chemical phenomena. In the following decades Hero's Pneumática, another influential source for Greek atomism, went through many translations into Latin and the vernacular. At the turn of the seventeenth century the debate between supporters and adversaries of the atomic doctrine had stimulated enough interest to encourage deliberate experimentation.
By that time internal problems within the Scholastic framework had weakened the Aristotelian position. One of these problems was the assumption of a creado ex nihilo of substantial forms. On the basis of the eternity and uncreatedness of Being, Aristotle had assumed that in many alterations, especially when elements were transmuted or new compounds formed, the form of the product appeared out of nothing, ex nihilo, whereas the forms of the original bodies disappeared into nothing, in nihilum. This issue had been vigorously disputed by the Peripatetics ever since. In Averroes' opinion forms were merely subordinate to matter and appear from or disappear into matter, and not from or into nothing. The later Averroism, as it flourished in the School of Padua in the sixteenth century, taught that during the process of mixture the forms were only broken (refractae) or gradually weakened. The followers of Avicenna, on the other hand, were inclined to admit the persistence of substantial forms of the reactants in a compound, although dominated by the more powerful substantial form of the mixture. It was exactly the latter view, that a compound contained its elements in actu, which was favored among the Peripatetic physicians, and it was but natural that Avicenna's doctrine made people more inclined to accept unchangeable and enduring corpuscles as constituent parts of a mixture. 8 The Lucretian axiom nihil ex nihilo, echoing Epicurus, must have been appealing as a simple and reasonable way out of the dilemma. In addition, the axiom was also not unacceptable to an enlightened, "secular" Aristotelianism, despite the theological difficulties that arose if nihil ex nihilo was confronted with the biblical account of creation.
Influenced by nominalist thought, many natural philosophers turned toward the empirically accessible particulars of nature. In David Gorlaeus's posthumously published Exercitationes philosophicae of 1620 universals had no existence; only individual things, defined by their intrinsic properties, were real: that is, essence and existence, essence and properties, quantity and body, were the same. 10 Only in thought could the attributes of a body, such as number, quantity, and physicochemical properties, be distinguished from the body itself. The only reality was the reality of the physical particulars, the atoms: nihil reale esse in corporibus praeter átomos. Occam's razor, that the entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, was quoted by Gorlaeus again and again. A decade later Joachim Jungius referred to it as the hypothesis hypotheseon.
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The experience of practical men, separated from the mainstream of learning by educational and social barriers, had become more influential since the Renaissance. By the very nature of their crafts they treated matter in a nonphilosophical, purposeful way. For obvious reasons metallurgists, assayers, chemists, and apothecaries were more concerned with the properties of the products than with the theory of the processes. Seventeenth-century chemistry was a rational and pragmatic subject, devoted to medical, pharmaceutical, and metallurgical purposes.
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If we judge it on the basis of Jean Beguin's Tyrocinium chymicum of 1610, the most influential chemical manual of the time, the field had divorced itself from the old dream of gold and longevity and was explicitly atheoretical and concerned primarily with substances, their essentials, and their classification as distinct species. It should also be remembered that the available theories of matter rested upon a rather limited acquaintance with metals and minerals. Alchemists and practical men, on the other hand, knew a great deal about these things, and they knew how to handle and study them experimentally. As far as the experimental approach is concerned, the alchemical heritage did much to determine the questions of early modern theory of matter. Within this context of empirical chemistry the corpuscular hypothesis gained momentum and made converts. If we examine the web of arguments presented in support of the atomic theory of matter during the first half of the seventeenth century, the chemical arguments appear particularly powerful.
III. EPISTEMOLÓGICA!, ARGUMENTS
Many of the arguments adduced in support of atomism were epistemological. Of these, one important group was concerned primarily with the relationship be-tween the structures of the external world and the corresponding structures and abilities of human perception and cognition. In regard to that relationship, one solution, rigid mechanical atomism, had little to offer the more empirically minded naturalists. Since it located the observed qualities within the sensations and the mind of the observer, how could one ever be able to know about reality through experiment? A solution at the other extreme was proposed by Claude Gillermet de Bérigard, a Frenchman who taught in Pisa and Padua, knew Galileo personally, and is likely to have witnessed the condemnation of the atomistic Positiones public ae at Paris in 1624. In his Cir cuius Pis anus of 1643, a rather traditional dialogue, Bérigard suggested a theory of matter that might be termed a "qualitative atomism." 13 Every possible quality was, so to speak, incorporated into atoms, each atom being the corporeal hypostasis of only one quality. Consequently, there were as many different kinds of atoms as there were different qualities in nature, and only their juxtaposition and interference in macroscopic aggregates added up to the qualities we see, feel, smell, or taste. The remarkable point in Bérigard's theory is that his quality-atoms were unchangeable, so that qualities became the basic entities in nature, and the study of qualities, as it could be performed in the laboratory, would eventually lead to the basic level of reality. Thus Bérigard was able to avoid the epistemological break between the sensuous qualities and the properties of the atoms which had been such a disturbing feature of Greek atomism. 14 Usually, however, the solution to this problem of how the primary qualities of the corpuscles produce the sensation of secondary qualities in the observer was sought somewhere between the two extremes. Thus the notion of element-and this means of course the four Aristotelian elements-was to some extent amalgamated with that of atoms. The identification of corpuscles and elements is already present in Sebastian Basso's Philosophia naturalis adversus Aristotelem of 1621. The author admitted, however, that it would be impossible to decide whether the particles of fire, air, water, and earth were in fact the ultimate atoms, and so he was probably the first to introduce a clear concept of secondary, tertiary, quaternary, and so on, aggregates which, in chemical reactions, behave as if they were stable particles. 15 In a similar way Daniel Sennert, a very influential yet little-studied figure, imagined the minima naturae or atomi to be smallest units of the four elements, which in turn compose the prima mixta as the real, experimentally treatable units of matter. The closest amalgamation of the concepts of atom, element, and pure substance that can be found before the nineteenth century, however, was reached by Joachim Jungius in 1632. the gap between perceivable and experimentally accessible qualities of macroscopic bodies and those of the ultimate constituents of matter had almost disappeared.
Another epistemological assumption underlying atomism was that knowledge requires the existence of some basic entities in reality upon which, as upon irreducible units or axioms, both cognition and the plurality of nature could be built. It was no less a person than Giordano Bruno who incorporated this idea-originally formulated by Nicholas of Cusa-into his notion of minimum. For Bruno, the existence of a smallest, indivisible unit, such as the point in geometry, the atom in physics, and the monad in metaphysics, was the matrix of reality, the measure and prerequisite of cognition.
17 However, Bruno's physical atoms had no sensuous properties, they were all of the same kind, and only in the senses did they appear endowed with specificity. But still they were the units out of which nature builds her fabric and into which bodies dissolve again.
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Since the same principle of synthesis and analysis was valid in art and in nature, it should be not only natural but indeed necessary to proceed from the simple to the complex, once the point of departure had been found.
In 1621 Sebastian Basso, one of the most influential authors among the early corpuscularians, proposed the argument that the instauration of learning had to begin with the most basic entities of reality, namely, the physical principles or atoms, from which level all future conclusions would depend. Their exact determination would be a prerequisite for any solid science, since these principles were as important in the natural sciences as characters in typography or building materials in a construction. Consequently, they had to be preexistent, incorruptible, and finite in number.
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Jungius's thoughts were quite similar. In his opinion a distinct science of nature required above all a finite number of principles, just as Euclidean geometry relies upon a small number of basic entities such as the point, the line, and the angle. Jungius's attempt to rebuild the system of physical knowledge belongs to the widespread quest for making both philosophy and natural science as axiomatically structured as geometry. In contrast to most of his contemporaries, Jungius insisted that only the evidence of sensuous experience and an inductive methodology would lead to the identification of these ultimate units of reality. These hypostatical principles, as he termed them, were not me- chanical atoms in the classical or in the Boylean sense, but real, chemically distinct parts that could be separated by chemical analysis.
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IV. ARGUMENTS BASED ON DIVISIBILITY
The second type of argument for or against atomism was based on mathematical or geometrical grounds. The ancient refutation of atomism had been based upon reasoning of this kind, since logical contradictions result if one assumes that division of continuous bodies leads to indivisible bodies, or, vice versa, that geometrical points add up to form an extended line. It was the concept of the atom as the limit of divisibility that dominated philosophical discussion from Aristotle to the Renaissance, and the arguments need not be repeated here. Their impact was still felt in the seventeenth century, for instance, in Galileo's theory of matter or in Thomas Harriot's unpublished notes on Zeno's paradoxes, in which Harriot inferred the atoms on the basis of mathematical progressions, which he considered as analogues to the structures of the corporeal world. 21 In general, however, it was more the concept of a physical atom as a constituent part that became the prevailing idea at this time. Thus the äio/zog was replaced by the concept of principle (ápxrj) or element (aroixsiov)-although "element" was intended in a formal, not in any chemical, sense as a binary relation in the form "JC is an element of y" that goes back to the Aristotelian definition. For Giordano Bruno the minimum was clearly a relational notion that referred to the process of composing and decomposing, an idea that allowed him to distinguish mathematical and physical minima, at the price, however, of somewhat bizarre mathematics.
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Yet for those who professed themselves empiricists the mathematical arguments had little to do with their scientific questions. They reluctantly dismissed the quarrel about the difference between atoms and limits in favor of a more pragmatic concept of little particles that looked as if it would be useful in the laboratory. This change of attitude is best illustrated by Sennert's dismissal of mathematical arguments in matter theory. In the concluding paragraph of his chapter on atoms in the Hypomnemata physica he frankly declared that in physics the divisibility of the continuum was not a relevant question. The only relevant question was whether nature in generation and resolution subsists in some kind of small bodies.
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V. ARGUMENTS BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENTS
The empirical arguments presented in favor of atomism during the first half of the seventeenth century fall roughly into six groups:
1. Extrapolations from the visible to beyond the limits of sense perception. 2. Attempts to use the microscope to extend the reach of the eyes to the intrinsic textures of matter. 3. Transport processes of material character, such as evaporation, abrasion, or growth. 4. Arguments taking the physical problems related to condensation and rarefaction, including the question of the vacuum, as their point of departure. 5. Observations related to noncorporeal species such as light, magnetism, sound, or heat. 6. Arguments derived from phenomena involving qualitative alterations of chemical substances.
Extrapolations
Arguments based upon extrapolations from macroscopic bodies were the more traditional ones, already put forward in classical antiquity; most of them in fact are in Lucretius's De rerum natura. They all start from the trivial experience that macroscopic bodies are distinct and go on to extrapolate from this distinctiveness to an underlying material reality. The most frequently quoted example was the one of insects that are so tiny that their third part would be below the limits of visibility. How small then, Lucretius asked, must their internal organs be, how small their heart, their eyes, their feet? And each of these is in turn composed of atoms. Although Lucretius's consideration was aimed merely at making plausible the unbelievably small size of atoms, the observation was frequently quoted in order to prove their very existence. It occurs in Bruno, Basso, Sennert, Gassendi, and Magnenus, to mention only a few. 24 On a similar level lies Lucretius's comparison of the atomic size with the size of the tiny motes dancing back and forth if a ray of sunlight falls in a dark room. Again the passage, which goes back to Democritus, was referred to by Basso, Gassendi, and many others in the seventeenth century.
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Evidently most of these references, even if they did not always mention their sources, go back to classical authorities, not to fresh observation. The empirical facts referred to were topoi of the scholarly literature. Their aim was to appeal to the reader's erudition and imagination, rather than to his critical or experimental abilities. They belong to a literary tradition of figurative rhetoric, aimed at creating astonishment and, by means of astonishment, assent and persuasion. Their frequent occurrence reflects once more the overwhelming influence of Lucretius's De rerum natura upon sixteenth-and seventeenth-century minds, not only because of its scientific merits, but also because of its poetic and imaginative qualities.
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Authors only scarcely expanded on these examples; instead they simply repeated or quoted them either in action or in writing. Bérigard presents us with a carefully designed experimental verification of Lucretius's motes in the sunbeam. His aim was to exclude the possibility that the phenomenon might be caused by major particles such as normal dust. For this purpose he sealed a glass vessel and kept it quiet for a very long time to make sure that all dust had settled down. The minute reflecting particles he was nevertheless able to see inside the glass were therefore judged to be the atoms themselves. Under the heading "Atomi quibus experimentis asseri possunt" Bérigard described his experiment:
In vase vitreo purissimus aer inclusus, nec a vento aut alio quod sciatur impulsus, tarnen ad Solem ita expositus ut radij non totum collustrent, sed per foramen clausae fenestrae, ut saepe fit, medium pertranseant, oberrare videntur et ultro citroque concursare multa corpuscula, non tantüm in aere externo, ubi pulverem volaticum suspicaberis, sed etiam in eo qui multis annis vitro concluditur, et cuius pulvis, si quis est, iampridem fundum petere debuit. Atqui omnino nisi volitarent tenuia multa corpuscula, radio per duo foramina conclavis obscuri transeúnte, nullus fieret luminis repercussus et si quis ibi conclusus oculos quam máxime intenderet in eum radium, nihil tarnen intueretur: At vero propius obtutum defigenti semper aliquid conspicitur, quod aliud esse non potest, quam atomi, ad quas lumen impingens minima ex parte ad nos deflectitur, feré enim totum inter atomorum vacuitates recta procedit. 27 Among those who made the first, if cautious, steps toward a quantitative determination of atomic dimensions by means of experiments was Daniel Sennert. In a series of experiments designed to prove the existence and demonstrate the size of the atoms by chemical resolutio Sennert described, first of all, a distillation in which he made a stream of alcohol vapor pass through a sheet of writing paper that had been folded four times. From the density of the paper and its invisibly small pores one might imagine how small the atoms really were if they passed through it so freely. This was certainly an impressive observation, but again it was also a tacit reference to Lucretius, who said the same about filtration of In a similar vein is Sennert's comparison between the smoky wick of an extinguished candle, which was not even the size of a pea, and the huge volume of air that was filled with its smoke: "Et quanta inter corpus compactum et in átomos resolutum sit differentia, vel candela extincta docet. Si quis enim flammam é candela accensa flatu dissipet, ellychnium fumigans, quod vix pisi magnitudinem aequat, tantam continuo atomorum copiam emittit, ut magnum aéris spatium eä repleatur." 30 The language in which these observations were described abounded with quantitative statements about the duration of the experiment (biduum vel triduum), the number of corpuscles (aliquot myriades), the amount of the product (vix unam guttam), or the size of the candlewick (vix pisi magnitudinem). There is not, however, the vaguest idea of a quantitative methodology behind these indications. The language of the laboratory displays its figurative and rhetorical power, aimed at the imagination of the reader and his eventual persuasion. In tribute to the new scientific age, arguments needed support from the rhetoric of the experiment. But to do justice to Sennert, we have to admit that, in this case, even the most scrupulous quantitative experimenter would not have arrived at any result.
A few decades later Johannes Chrysostomus Magnenus, professor of medicine at Pavia, suggested exact figures for the size of an atom on the basis of impressive quantitative calculations. Taking Archimedes' Sand-Reckoner as a model, Magnenus estimated the number of particles in a grain of incense from the volume of air filled with its scent: ad minimum elementalium atomorum millio inesset, unde, secundum hanc regulam, fuissent in hoc thuris grano, pisi magnitudinem non superante, atomi elementales ad minimum 777.600.000.000.000.000. Ex quibus patet, quantae sit parvitatis atomus una, conjicique potest, quantus sit atomorum numerus in toto universo. numbers. In 1654 Walter Charleton published exactly the same calculationprobably a mere translation from Magnenus, though the author did not disclose his source. At least Charleton should have heeded the warnings of his hero Gassendi: referring to Archimedes' attempts to compute the number of sand grains that would fit into a poppy seed, the French philosopher had already pinpointed the methodological problems involved in transferring this kind of geometric reasoning to physical matters. His conclusion was that one must not apply to physics that which the mathematicians have demonstrated abstractly.
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In contrast to Gassendi, the author of Democritus reviviscens displayed a philosophically inconsistent attitude. Although he tried to imitate the Euclidean method of presentation, his work abounded with purely dialectical reasoning and syllogistic conclusions. After the detailed calculations quoted above, he freely admitted that, apart from conjectures, one could never know anything about the absolute or even relative sizes of atoms.
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But since Magnenus's calculations have recently been called the beginning of the quantitative methodology in atomic physics, it might be worthwhile examining more closely the attitude of this allegedly scientific mind toward experience and experiment.
There is no doubt that Magnenus favored the empirical and mechanical spirit of his age. Among the axioms of his natural philosophy is the often-repeated principle that, in physical matters, one has to philosophize on the basis of experience and judge by the senses: "In iis, quae sub sensum cadunt, posita experientia oportet philosophari, sensibilia enim per sensus judicanda sunt." He even went so far as to claim that the results of precise experimentation should be taken as self-evident presuppositions in scientific reasoning: "Experientias accurate factas tanquam principia per se nota admittere." 35 However, this empiricism was embedded in a great number of purely abstract and speculative arguments. The same inconsistency applies to the six "proofs" Magnenus gave for the existence of atoms. Five of them stem from, and were defended on, philosophical grounds alone; the sixth at least was the "experience of the chemists," for which the author referred, if somewhat vaguely, to Sennert's Hypomnema 3.2.
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The only real experiment Magnenus presented on some five pages was taken from Jacques Gaffarel's Curiositez inouyes sur la sculpture talismanique des Persans, horoscope des patriarches et lecture des estoilles of 1629, a widely read and controversial compendium of natural magic. From this dubious source Mag- nenus took the then widely discussed story of a Polish physician who kept a collection of sealed glass vessels that contained finely ground flowers of various kinds. But when a candle was put underneath such a vessel containing the ashes of a rose, the corpuscles coalesced under the influence of the heat to form a perfect rose. When the candle was removed, the appearance disintegrated again into its atoms.
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This strange experiment, which goes back to a report given by Joseph du Chesne in 1604, was originally presented as an example of palingenesis or resuscitation of living bodies from their ashes by virtue of the formative or seminal power inherent in their salts. Curiously enough, this Paracelsian paradigm acquired some fame among the proofs of the reality of the atoms later on. Etienne de Clave, the skilled chemist and physician who had intended to prove the truth of the scandalous anti-Aristotelian theses presented in 1624, was reported to have performed daily this experiment of reproducing an herb or a flower from its ashes.
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The phenomenon was discussed even among the most respectable scientists of the time, but this is not the place to follow up the strange vicissitudes of the palingenesis experiment, the tradition of which can be traced down to Romantic Naturphilosophie and nineteenth-century debates over chemical vitalism.
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Microscopical Perception
It was more than merely a physical analogy to mathematical extrapolations when Daniel Sennert, after an exposition of the structure of clouds and smoke, concluded that from their small drops and particles one could infer the existence of ultimate particles. Atmospheric phenomena seemed especially well suited to support this approach, for according to the theory Aristotle put forward in his Meteorológica, they were not perfect mixtures but somewhat incomplete aggregates of the elements. Consequently Sennert stated that whoever is close to a cloud, for example, when hiking in the mountains, will be able to confirm that clouds are not continuous bodies but accumulations of atoms. Though this sounds like an empirical statement, it was almost certainly an allusion to Lucretius's theory of the formation of clouds. Meteora certé pleraque tantüm sunt Elementarium atomorum varia congeries. Exhalationes enim et vapores, quod vulgo creditur, non corpora continua sunt, sed congeries infinitarum atomorum: id quod ex vaporibus ex aqua, quae ad ignem calefit, ascendentibus manifestum est. Hi enim etsi procul corpus continuum videantur; tarnen qui prope est, aut qui in montibus aere nebuloso ambulat, vel visu discernere potest, vapores tales non esse continua corpora sed atomorum congeriem. Nubes nihil aliud sunt, nisi infinita atomorum multitudo. 40 Seventeenth-century science was fond of the small: it discovered worlds in a drop of water, and it developed the apparatuses to open up perspectives hitherto unseen. There was a widespread enthusiasm for the magnifying glass and for the microscope, which had just been invented. Microscopy became a preoccupation with the Baconians. 41 The new instruments made it possible to come closer to the details, closer to reality, and-so it was assumed-closer to truth. What had been the exclusive domain of speculation or extrapolation for centuries was now at least potentially observable. 42 The possibilities of optical ingenuity seemed almost unlimited. In a chapter on the size of the atoms Gassendi meditated about the degree of refinement to which the borderline between man's and nature's subtlety might be extended by means of the microscope (engyscopium):
Sané enim quae nostro visui apparent esse minima, ipsi naturae maxima sunt; ac dici potest, ubi nostra industria, subtilitásque desinit, inde incipere industriam, subtilitatémque naturae. Quippe, ut videas artifices qui annuli palla concludant tot illas horology parteis, quas nisi turris capacitate rudiores fabri non valeant; ita Natura plureis parteis in milij grano distinguere, quam homo pos sit in Caucaso, imö in toto globo telluris. Videri id incredibilius poterat maioribus nostris, ante inventionem Engyscopij; nunc verö, qui possit, cüm videamus granum detritissimi pulveris piso amplius repraesentari, et cum distinctissimis quidem facieculis, angulísque, de quibus ne venire quidem in mentem suspicio potuisset: adeö ut cum diameter corpusculi Engyscopio visi sit propemodum céntupla ad diametrum citra ipsum visam, dicere liceat ipsum saltern ex decies centenis millibus partium esse conflatum. Saltern, inquam, nam cogita et Engyscopium perfectius, quam hactenus viderimus, et acutissimum quemque visum consistere semper infra naturae industriam; et agnosces denique rem abire propé in immensum. 43 What had been a merely potential aptitude of the instrument to Gassendi, carefully restricted by the saltern of his epistemological reservation, was presented as an empirical fact by the English physician Henry Power only a few years later. In To Henry Power this was certainly more than the selling rhetoric and pretentious phraseology so common in prefaces. Among the many microscopical observations described in his Experimental Philosophy, mainly of insects and plants, there were also a few of chemicals. For instance, Power studied traces of running mercury and found that the "atoms of Quick-silver . . . seemed like a globular Looking-glass." From the heterogeneity and particulate structure of a "cosmetical mercury precipitate" he was viewing through his lenses, he inferred that the metal atoms remain unaltered when a compound is formed and retain invisibly their true nature: "You may most plainly and distinctly see all the globular Atoms of current and quick [mercury] ; besprinkled all amongst those Powders, like so many little Stars in the Firmament: which shews that those Chymical Preparations, are not near so purely exalted and prepared, as they are presumed to be; nor the Mercury any way transmuted, but meerly by an Atomical Division rendred insensible."
46 Yet as a serious scientist Power had to admit that he had not succeeded in seeing any corporeal effluvia by means of his optical device, not even those of camphor or the transpiration of human skin, although a Dr. Highmore, perhaps with better eyes and a more powerful microscope, had claimed to have seen the magnetic effluvium "in the form of a Mist to flow from the Load-Stone." Power, the meticulous observer, was entirely conscious that such an observation, could it be proved to be true, would be the experimentum crucis for matter theory: "This Experiment indeed would be an incomparable Eviction of the Corporeity of Magnetical Effluviums, and sensibly decide the Controversie 'twixt the Peripatetick and Atomical Philosophers." 47 However stimulating these instruments were for the study of biology, their meaning for matter theory was ambiguous. Jungius used the magnifying glass to study textile fabric and apparently homogeneous substances such as polished surfaces. He observed that they were in fact always heterogeneous if viewed through a microscope (anchiscopium). In 1633, commenting on Sennert's Epitome scientiae naturalis of 1618, in which Sennert had shown that arguments from geometry about divisibility and continuity must not be applied to the physical sciences, Jungius remarked that until then no physical body had ever been proved to be entirely homogeneous. For no surface could be so smooth that one could not think of a more powerful microscope that would reveal its true discontinuity. Consequently, Jungius categorically stated that continuity was foreign to the realm of sensuous experience. On the other hand he had to admit that if there were no truly continuous parts in the end, infinite progression and divisibility would result. This was the vicious circle of every observational approach to the atoms.
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Methodological difficulties and a contradictory epistemology arose if one attempted to model the real after the visible.
Material Transport
The next type of argument is on a similar level. Different kinds of transport phenomena were considered in which material substances appear or disappear unnoticed. The standard examples are well known: Smell is an efflux of corporeal particles. Clothes that are hung near the seashore become wet and dry again in the sunshine, but no vapors can be observed. A ring on the finger gets worn out, and so do tools and road surfaces, and even a stone is hollowed by constant drops of water. Diminution and growth and the almost imperceptible loss of moisture by bodies, such as the drying of bread or the slow evaporation of liquids, are material processes, although the flux of material cannot be observed.
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In all these cases, quantitative change of material substances was recorded, and from this the existence of invisible parts of matter could be inferred. This was little more than an application of the theory of effluxion or ánoppoai proposed by Empedocles, Democritus, and Asclepiades of Prusa and eventually expounded in Lucretius's poem.
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In the seventeenth century these examples were repeated again and again, and similar ones were added. It was entirely in accord with the traditional line of argumentation when Daniel Sennert, in 1619, discussed the growth of chalk and stalactites from clear mineral waters, phenomena which, in his opinion, pointed to the corpuscular structure of matter. Again the observer's surprise over nature's mysteries is used as the point of departure for a rhetorical stratagem: "Cum tarnen aqua quae decurrit limpidissima sit, ut quis mirari possit, quomodo ex tarn perspicua et clara aqua corpus tarn crassum fieri queat. Proculdubio in talibus aquis mineralis et lapídea materia in mínimas partículas resoluta fuit, quae postea suo concurso et avvKpíaei saxeum et durum corpus constituent."
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It is difficult to believe that this kind of argumentation was taken as a scientific, empirical demonstration. For what did it prove except that there is material transport that cannot be seen? Perhaps three aspects should be given particular consideration: the phenomena dealt with suggested that the ultimate constituents of matter were potentially observable by extended experimental effort, deductible by analogy, and provable by virtue of their actions. There is little doubt, however, that these phenomena were not adequate for definitively deciding the question of matter, and they were certainly not understood in this manner by contemporaries. Yet the frequent occurrence and repetition of these observations, the persuasive idea that truth should be visible or could be thought of in a pictorial way, infiltrated scholarly discourse and the very language of science. Atomism was an enticingly pictorial image of reality. The wealth of appealing and immediately convincing images offered by Lucretius's poem supplied the scheme according to which material change was assumed to occur in nature. Consider Bérigard's experiment: the Lucretian motes in a sunbeam, which might have been simple dust particles, could of course not be taken seriously by the more sophisticated contemporaries of Galileo. Had not the microscope shown that even the smallest items were in reality composed of much smaller ones? Hence Bérigard made that very careful and reasonable experiment with sealed glass flasks to exclude all possible dust and turbulence in the air, and he actually saw the atoms. To be precise, he saw something "quod aliud esse non potest, quam atomi," just as Sennert perceived them in the droplets of fog and clouds or Henry Power in the mercury preparations under his microscope.
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Why then should they proceed any further, why devise more sophisticated experiments, why bother about the quantitative side, and why seek proofs, when the atoms were more than evident? The question of atomism had become rather a matter of plain evidence than of proof or confirmation.
Condensation and Rarefaction
Unlike the instances of analogical extrapolation from sense perception, the problems that arose from condensation and rarefaction and, above all, from the question of the vacuum belong to the field of physical experimentation proper, in which one would expect more convincing departures from the traditional ways of reasoning. In ancient atomism, with its hard and impenetrable atoms, change required motion, and motion required a void space to move into. The void was where the atoms were not; it formed the gaps between the particles. The nature of this void, however, was a matter of endless controversy until the eighteenth century. Yet as far as the experimental side was concerned, the question had not been advanced beyond the ancient state of affairs.
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Basically two alternatives were discussed: first, the continuous or three-dimensionally extended void (vacuum separatum), and, second, the more widely received idea of a discontinuous, interspersed void between the particles of matter (vacuum disseminatum). The latter was less difficult to accept since it did not imply the existence of a space whose dimensions were not defined by the surface of bodies.
There was one classic experiment that could be interpreted as evidence for the discontinuous structure of matter and the existence of microvacua: a vessel filled with loose ashes was reported to hold as much water as an empty vessel because the tiny ash particles are received within the pores or vacua of the water. Aristotle ascribed this observation to those who believed in the void, but he duly rejected it on the ground that two bodies cannot occupy the same space simultaneously. The observation was indeed puzzling and kept the medieval commentators busy.
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Most of them favored the explanation given by Averroes, who, while admitting that he had never viewed the phenomenon, denied the existence of vacua. Instead, he assumed a partial corruption of water by the ashes to be responsible for the shrinkage in volume.
Francis Bacon was presumably the first to disprove the phenomenon in question experimentally. In his posthumously published Sylva sylvarum he used his results to ridicule the old quarrel:
It is strange how the ancients took up experiments upon credit, and yet did build great matters upon them. The observation of some of the best of them, delivered confidently, is, that a vessel filled with ashes will receive the like quantity of water that it would have done if it had been empty. But this is utterly untrue; for the water will not go in by a fifth part. And I suppose that that fifth part is the difference of the lying close or open of the ashes; as we see that ashes alone, if they be hard pressed, will lie in less room; and so the ashes with air between lie looser, and with water closer. For I have not yet found certainly, that the water itself, by mixture of ashes or dust, will shrink or draw into less room. 55 This was a clear departure from the traditional way of reasoning. In reality, however, the matter was not as simple as one might believe from Bacon's straightforward refutation. In the second part of Gassendi's Syntagma philosophicum, published posthumously in 1658, the ash experiment was referred to as the traditional proof for the existence of an interspersed void (inane interspersum) but rejected on both experimental and philosophical grounds ("experimentum explorando falsum deprehenditur, uti et principas naturae repugnat"). Instead, the French philosopher proposed another and more convincing experiment in support of corpuscles and spatiola inania in a solution. He saturated water with ordinary salt and found, to his great surprise, that this solution was still as capable of dissolving alum as pure water would have been: "Experiundi gratia Alumen conieci in Aquam per complures dies sale impraegnatum; ac turn, non sine quodam stupore succedere coniecturam vidi: scilicet alumen perinde, ac si aqua sale caruisset, exsolutum fuit; ñeque id modo, sed et consequenter alios praeterea saléis exsolvit, et, ut paucis dicam, ostendit quam varia, insensibilia licet, loculamenta contineret."
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From this Gassendi concluded that there must be various differently shaped microvacua or loculamenta in the water, each kind of which receives exactly one kind of corpuscle, for example, a cubic space a cubic corpuscle such as salt, and an octahedral space an octahedral one such as alum.
57 Although Gassendi's account was somewhat vague regarding the decrease or increase of volume during this process, he must have assumed that the volume of the solution remains unaltered. Otherwise the entire argument would have been pointless. But was it not absurd to assume that the quantity of matter remains constant when another quantity is added? This is exactly what Jean-Baptiste Morin, a somewhat obscure and dubious French antiatomist and anti-Copernican, thought when he read Gassendi's report. He repeated the experiment more carefully in a glass flask with a graduated neck and found that when salt, alum, and sugar were added to water, the volume of the resulting solution was greater than that of pure water.
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From textual evidence alone, it is difficult to judge who was correct, Gassendi or Morin. At least, the controversy could not be as easily settled by a single experiment as Bacon had assumed. In fact, either observation, the constant or the increased volume, may have been correct: for there are indeed certain salts that do not increase the volume of water when they are dissolved, and water-free alum is one of them.
Apart from explaining dissolution, the assumption of discontinuous matter and interparticulate vacua seemed especially helpful in explaining the coherence of bodies. The standard experiment was the drawing apart of two perfectly flat surfaces from direct contact, first described by Lucretius to show that during this action a void must result, since the air cannot fill the entire opened space instantaneously. 59 Originally supposed to prove the existence of a vacuum, the experiment soon acquired a crucial position among the proofs for its nonexistence. It was in this latter sense that Galileo referred to it, for in his opinion the coherence of surfaces was a perfect illustration of nature's abhorrence of a vacuum. He availed himself of the occasion to describe, through the mouth of his spokesman Salviati, a hydrostatic experiment, based upon Hero's Pneumática and designed to measure the breaking force of a water column, which would give him a quantitative value for what he called "la resistenza del vacuo." It was exactly this "resistance of the vacuum" that he believed to be responsible for the strength and rupture tension of solid bodies. The melting of a metal, for instance, could then be explained by an influx of fire particles into the originally void spaces, so that the vacuola disappear and the hard metal loses cohesion. But as Galileo did not believe in an extended vacuum, he had to assume that the size of these vacuola is almost zero, whereas their number is beyond limit. Consequently, he assumed that solid bodies consist of an infinite number of atoms that have no extension at all (atomi non quanti), and an equally infinite number of dimensionless spaces between them.
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Strangely enough this implied that liquids were entirely continuous, because they lacked internal cohesion-a conclusion that some of Galileo's contemporaries arrived at for similar reasons. Still, the physical explanation of coherence remained a major difficulty within the corpuscular framework. Why do metals melt if heated, but not if finely crushed with a hammer? Why is silver liquefied by acid, but not if ground with a file? 61 The problem of coherence and the interspersed void became even more acute in condensation and rarefaction.
62 According to the Aristotelian doctrine a given amount of matter could assume, at different times, contrary qualities; and since dense and rare are contrary, the same amount of matter could occupy different volumes at different times. The standard example was the change from water to air or the change in volume that occurred if a liquid was heated or cooled.
63 Aristotelian matter was capable of stretching and contracting over a wide range of volumes without losing its continuity. There was indeed no corpuscular explanation of a similar simplicity available during the seventeenth century. Few authors would have admitted that the interspersed vacua could be blown up to a size that would account for the observed change of volume during evaporation. Otherwise, they would have had to admit a continuous vacuum. Even after the Torricellian vacuum had been experimentally demonstrated in 1643, it was by no means unanimously considered to be entirely void. Thus its impact on the corpuscular theory was doubtful. The first atomist to discuss the Torricellian experiment in great depth was presumably Gassendi in his Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, completed in 1646, but even his account of the extended void remained vague about its meaning for the theory of matter.
64 Besides, Gassendi believed it was solely an artificial phenomenon with no equivalent in nature.
Instead of admitting the void, most authors held that there was some kind of ether or spirit between the impenetrable particles of gross matter. This medium filled the spaces between the vapor atoms and glued the corpuscles of solid bodies together. This was also the explanation favored by Gorlaeus, who identi- fied it with the air, which he believed to be capable of neither expansion nor compression. Basso imagined a spiritus or a very thin corporeal substance to go between the particles of expanding air in order to prevent the formation of a vacuum.
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It should not be overlooked, however, that the reintroduction of an active spirit or ether into atomism undermined the advantages and theoretical consistency of the corpuscular theory.
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If a mechanical explanation of condensation and rarefaction was sought, the ether was certainly not a convincing solution. Other alternatives were equally weak. Magnenus, who strongly rejected the vacuum and denied any real condensation or rarefaction, offered a strange blend of atomism and Aristotelian stretchability of matter. He endowed his atoms with the ability to expand almost indefinitely in two dimensions while the third dimension shrinks accordingly, so that the surface remains constant, or "isoperimetric" as he termed it. The idea was that an extremely expanded atom would dilute and augment, so to speak, the space it occupied before. In this way expansion could be explained without admitting the inflation of interparticulate vacua. From these examples it is clear that, in contrast to classical atomism, the vacuum, be it dispersed or extended, was not a conditio sine qua non for a corpuscular theory in the seventeenth century. Plenist corpuscularians such as Bérigard, Basso, or Descartes witness that it was entirely acceptable to assume corpuscles without admitting the void.
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Atoms of Light
One last type of physical argument should be mentioned at least briefly: the evidence of a particulate structure of matter derived from nonmaterial phenomena such as sound, heat, magnetism, electricity, or light. Most of the early attempts to substantialize or materialize the immaterial would lead us too far away from the main purpose of this study. They originate from ancient atomism and were taken up again by many seventeenth-century authors. Explicit formulations, however, such as Basso's atoms of heat and cold, Gorlaeus's atoms of time, or the quality-atoms imagined by Bérigard, remained exceptional. enough to go through the pores of even hard and dense bodies. Lucretius had imagined atoms of light in order to explain the almost instantaneous transmission of light and images through space. Such atoms were extensively used by Bérigard and questioned by Gorlaeus, reflecting, however, more of a literary tradition than an empirical one. This is equally true for Gassendi, whose theory of light and vision was little more than a compromise between the ancient doctrine of corpuscular effluvia, the Lucretian simulacra, and Scholastic assumptions about the propagation of immaterial species through a medium. 69 In that regard the Cartesian theory of light is remarkable, since it made contact with experience and optical experimentation at various points, even if derived from an a priori conception of matter.
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In purely optical treatises, on the other hand, little reference to matter theory is to be found. After all, optics was then a branch of mathematics or physiology, the methods and results of which were not normally considered to solve physical puzzles.
It is, therefore, on the borderline between physics and optics that we meet with an early example of how optical observations interacted with matter theory. In a series of letters exchanged between 1606 and 1608, Thomas Harriot and Johannes Kepler discussed the phenomenon of partial reflection and partial transmission of light in diaphanous bodies. The question was, how could an apparently continuous body transmit and reflect at the same time? Harriot imagined that the continuity was only in our senses, whereas in reality some corporeal parts at the surface resist the rays and therefore reflect, while other rays penetrate into the vacua between them, are reflected within the body, and leave it, scattering in many directions. The most striking example of this kind was probably gold, an entirely homogeneous, dense, and opaque body that reflects light like a mirror. But a thin gold foil reflects and is translucent at the same time. For Harriot, it seemed absurd to assume that a single homogeneous substance can be endowed simultaneously with two opposing qualities, transparency and opacity. Kepler, however, did not want to follow Harriot ad átomos et vacua and suggested keeping optics and matter theory distinct and accepting exactly this contradictory assumption. 71 We cannot go into the many difficulties that arose from argumentation based upon the corpuscular nature of light. It seems to have played but a minor role in seventeenth-century atomism, except for the conventional explanation of transparency and diaphaneity by assuming that atoms of light pass through the pores of matter. But it must be remembered that, in the tradition of Newton's Opticks, the corpuscular nature of light became a most powerful argument in eighteenthcentury theories of matter. 
Chemical Change
The "chemical" arguments proposed in support 0f the atomic view of matter fall basically into two categories: arguments that reijer to processes during which a new mixtum or compound is generated, and proofs based upon the recovery of constituents from a mixture. In either case an explanation was required of how distinct particles interact and of how, from this interaction, new qualities emerge that were not originally present in the reactants. The emergence of a new form during substantial alterations, the so-called eductio formae, was indeed the great theme of early seventeenth-century Peripatetic theory of matter. 73 The traditional alternative explanations were descent of the form from the forma caeli or from a dator formae, and eduction from the potentiality of matter. Divorced from these learned speculations, the common attitude of metallurgists and practical alchemists was to ignore such abstract questions while naively taking the original reactants as the true constituents of a compound. Was it not reasonable to assume, for example, that the ingredients required to make up a complicated medicine were actually present in this preparation, with all their respective virtues? This pragmatic solution was favored by many iatrochemical authors. They were trained in the laboratory and little troubled by philosophical scruples. Jean Beguin's Tyrocinium chymicum of 1610 is a well-known example of this kind of approach.
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It was not apt, however, to satisfy the needs of a natural philosopher. Consider a sweet and ripe fruit, said Giovanni Nardi, the editor of a Florentine edition of Lucretius's De rerum natura, attacking Sennert's corpuscular interpretation of substantial change: where were the ripeness and sweetness beforehand? The same little part (eadem portiuncula) that was previously astringent and bitter is now soft and sweet, but no significant change of weight has occurred. How then could this maturation be explained without admitting a new substantial form? 75 Similar difficulties arose when decompositions such as chemical analyses were considered. The products that resulted from dissolution or diacrisis were commonly believed to be "parts" of the original compound. The terms part or constituent, sometimes element, implied the relation between a whole and its parts. Though this seems fairly reasonable, it led to incredible difficulties if applied to chemical processes. For whether something was regarded as composition or decomposition was often a matter of chance. As long as quantitative alterations, especially the decrease or increase of weight, were not systematically taken into account, there was no means of distinguishing between the two alternatives. Consequently, the dissolution of wood by fire would result in its "parts" of smoke and ash, the dissolution of milk in its "parts" of whey, butter, and cheese.
It is easy to understand that here purely mechanical action, and especially local motion, was not a sufficient explanation for the requirements of a chemical philosophy of matter, though some kind of motion was generally accepted as a prerequisite for the formation of a compound. But as Magnenus stated it, any undirected local motion of particles would account for disintegration only, not for concord and unition. 76 This then was the point of entry for additional hypotheses that did not originally belong to or were even contradictory to the principles of atomism. Assumptions of this kind were the corporeal ether, the active spirit, Neoplatonic concepts of sympathy and antipathy, or the teleology of noble or directing forms that act upon moving particles.
It is significant that Sennert explicitly admitted that, given the dimness of human cognition, there was no way of proving the mechanism by which the unity of parts was brought about and the form of the new compound generated. Practical chemist as he was, he preferred to leave these questions to others and went on to argue that at least one thing was certain, namely, that every mixture could be resolved into those parts out of which it was originally constituted. In other words, the substantial identity of the constituent parts must persist unchanged; otherwise there would be a generation of new constituents during the process of resolution and decay: "Hoc certum est, mistum quodlibet in ea, é quibus primo constitutum est, resolvi posse: et proinde formas elementorum non aboleri. Alias enim in resolutione et putredine fieret nova elementorum generado."
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This was a most important step in the "chemical" argumentation in favor of corpuscles. For now it was no longer necessary to deal exclusively with the process of substantial change and the emergence of new qualities. Instead the question of the corpuscles' existence was reduced to a test of identity in a cyclic process that could easily be performed by the chemical means of the time. If then the identity of the original reactants and the products of decomposition could be demonstrated experimentally, the persistency of this material carrier would have been proved, no matter how many alterations had meanwhile occurred. This was clearly a departure from the former preoccupation with the quiddity of processes, and a shift from the ontological level of atomism to something that might be called a "black box theory" of chemical change.
Reduction to the Pristine State. There is ample evidence that the ground for this new perspective had been laid by the pragmatism and atheoretical attitude of metallurgists and iatrochemists. Imagine a goldsmith who during an alloying or reducing operation did not make the concept of substantial identity the very basis of his trade. However, such people were barely literate, and we do not know their theoretical suppositions about the connection between the material they were working on and its properties. Yet on the fringes of the learned tradition were a few noteworthy exceptions, among them Angelus Sala, an Italian who spent most of his life in Germany as a court physician, pharmacist, and adviser on commercial subjects. In his Anatomía vitrioli of 1609, which had to be translated from the vernacular since the author did not even know Latin, he described the formation and decomposition of copper vitriol pragmatically and to some extent also quantitatively. In doing so Sala distinguished, as usual, between transmutations, which occurred without major material additives and implied destruction of the old and emergence of a new substantial form, and changes that resulted from a mere juxtaposition or separation of finely divided particles. These latter processes were either coniunctiones, such as the alloying of gold and silver to yield electron or the apposition of particles of copper, acid, and water to yield vitriol, or reductiones, by means of which these little particles were reassembled into their former coherent state: "Reductio autem est operatio quaedam, per quam recolligimus et in unam massam coadunamus rem quampiam quae in minutissimas partículas dispersa et dilatata erat ... et interim tarnen per Reductionem in pristinum suum statum et essentiam revocatur et reducitur."
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The standard example was a solution of gold in aqua regia (a mixture of hydrochloric and nitric acids) and its precipitation using metallic silver. From Sala's account it is clear that he considered processes of this kind as mere divisions and rearrangements of metal atoms in which the metals retain their substantial identity, although "hidden" because of their dispersion into single atoms. As a practical chemist Sala did not bother with the nature of this "hiding" of qualities. Instead he accepted the reduction to its pristine metallic state as sufficient evidence for the persistence of "gold" throughout this process of dissolution and recovery. Even the delicate question whether gold in the form of aurum potabile retained its medical virtues and was therefore "real" gold-a much discussed topic at the time since potable gold was believed to be an almost universal medicine-was dismissed by Sala with the words that, instead of listening to the testimony of hundreds of authorities, one need only pay attention to the craftsmen: their expertise showed that gold could be recovered in its pristine form from such solutions without any damage to its qualities: "Possemus de hoc ipso vel sexcenta auctorum testimonia adducere, nisi magis adtenderemus ad id, quod agant isti artifices, quam quid loquantur. ... si in manus experti artificis incidat, ä spiritibus salium et sulphuris adpactis, liberari possit, et deinde pristinae suae formae, sine ulla qualitatum suarum laesione, restituí." 79 The naive corpuscularianism behind this conception of chemical change implied, however, that Sala regarded vitriol and all metal salts as mere aggregates of corpuscles, at the price of abandoning the idea of the homogeneity and substantiality of such compounds. At least from the chemical point of view this was a bit too simple, even for his contemporaries, and did not explain why properties of the atoms, such as their metallic character, disappear in the dispersed state and reappear when they are precipitated.
Hence Daniel Sennert, the learned professor of medicine, preferred to maintain the teleology of noble forms in order to account for the specific properties of the mixture. Expanding on Sala's corpuscular approach, Sennert conceived a
